By James Perloff
On June 25, 1950, Kim Il-sung, North Korea’s communist dictator, sent his troops to invade South Korea. American forces, fighting under UN authority, came to South Korea’s defense, in a bloody three-year war that ended in stalemate.
But how did Kim Il-sung and the communists come to power in North Korea? U.S. foreign policy put them there, in a roundabout way.
During World War II, the U.S. fought the Germans in Europe and the Japanese in Asia. The Soviet Union, then under Joseph Stalin’s brutal rule, was America’s “ally” during this war. The Soviets, however, only fought Germany; they maintained a nonaggression pact with Japan.
But at the “Big Three” conferences at Teheran and Yalta, President Roosevelt asked Stalin if he would break his treaty with Japan and enter the Pacific war. Stalin agreed – on condition that the United States supply him with all the weapons, vehicles and materiel his Far Eastern army would need for the expedition. Roosevelt agreed, and some 600 shiploads of supplies were sent to Russia to equip Stalin’s army to fight Japan.
This was an absurd foreign policy decision. Stalin was a well-known aggressor. The 1939 invasion of Poland, which officially began World War II, had actually been a joint venture by the Germans and Soviets. In 1940, Stalin had invaded Finland, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, and annexed part of Romania. No one could seriously believe he would bring benevolence to Asia.
Stalin did not send his army into the Far East until five days before the war ended; Japan, already struck by the atomic bomb, was ready to surrender. Soviet forces moved into China, where, after very limited fighting, they accepted the surrender of huge Japanese weapons depots. They then turned these weapons, plus their own American lend-lease supplies, over to communist rebel Mao Tse-tung. Thus armed, the Chinese communists ultimately overthrew the Nationalist government.
Prior to this, Korea had been a Japanese protectorate. In April 1944, Foreign Affairs – journal of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) – published an article entitled “Korea in the Postwar World.” It suggested turning Korea into a trusteeship ruled by the Allies including Russia. Naturally, Stalin agreed with this idea when it was formally discussed, and the Soviets received power over North Korea, while the U.S. occupied Korea’s southern half.
Considering that the Soviets did almost nothing to win the Pacific war, North Korea was an enormous trophy to give the dictator Stalin, well known to have murdered millions of his own people. Stalin swiftly established a communist government under Kim Il-sung in North Korea, building a 150,000-man army with hundreds of tanks, hundreds of warplanes, and heavy artillery. When the United States departed South Korea, on the other hand, it left only a constabulary force of 16,000 South Koreans with small arms – they did not have a single tank or even one anti-tank gun.
Given communism’s record of insatiable expansionism, this arms imbalance made the invasion of South Korea inevitable. Kim-Il Sung waited until Mao Tse-tung consolidated communist control of China in 1949, securing Kim’s rear. In January 1950, Kim proclaimed this would be Korea’s “year of unification” and called for “complete preparedness for war.” Two weeks later, as if to sweeten the pot for Kim, America’s ever-intriguing Secretary of State Dean Acheson (CFR, Scroll & Key, Committee of 300) gave a speech on the Far East which placed South Korea beyond the U.S. “defensive perimeter.”
Should any attack occur outside the perimeter, Acheson declared, the victims would have to rely “upon the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations.” This remark intimated the role the Korean War was to play in the Illuminati agenda.
The Illuminati are Satanists. They seek world domination. The Bible predicts that the Antichrist or “beast” will have authority “over every tribe, people, language and nation” (Revelation 13:7). To govern the world requires a world government – this is self-evident.
The remarkably predictive Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion – whose uncritically accepted status as a hoax is discussed in Chapter 18 of Truth Is a Lonely Warrior – openly proposed world government. In Protocol 5:11, for example, the authors declared that their cartel was “gradually to absorb all the state forces of the world and to form a super-government.”
In America, gradual establishment of world government was entrusted to the Council on Foreign Relations, founded in 1921 in direct response to the U.S. Senate’s rejection of the Versailles Treaty, which would have joined America to the League of Nations. After the League later failed, its successor was, of course, the United Nations. The plan for the UN was secretly contrived by a group of CFR members in the State Department. They called themselves the Informal Agenda Group, selecting this innocuous-sounding name to preempt any suspicions in Congress about what they were up to.
When the UN held its founding conference in San Francisco in 1945, most of the American delegates – 47 of them – were CFR members. Alger Hiss, who would later be exposed as a Soviet spy, was Secretary General at the conference. This time, the Illuminati were taking no chances that the Senate would reject the UN, as it had the League. Hiss flew directly from San Francisco to Washington, with the UN Charter in a locked safe. After glib assurances from delegates, the charter was ratified by the Senate after limited discussion. John D. Rockefeller, Jr. donated $8.5 million to purchase the land where the UN was built; his younger brother David, of course, was long chairman of the CFR and remains honorary chairman.
Once the UN was established, the next natural step was to try to empower it. This required that its credentials as a peacekeeper be validated, for the first purpose listed in the UN Charter is “To maintain international peace and security.” This was where the Korean War came into play.
Nearly two years into the Korean War, Adlai Stevenson penned the lead article for the April 1952 Foreign Affairs entitled “Korea in Perspective,” in which he summed up thus: “The burden of my argument, then, based on the meaning of our experience in Korea as I see it, is that we have made historic progress toward the establishment of a viable system of collective security.”
The term “collective security” was hypocrisy. During the Korean War, 90 percent of the UN’s forces were American. Although 15 other nations sent troops, their contribution was, numerically speaking, token. Tens of thousands of America soldiers would die under the UN flag.
Congressional opposition to the League of Nations had been largely based on the threat which a supranational government could present to American sovereignty. The UN action in Korea underscored just how justified those concerns had been. The 10th section of the Protocols (published 1903) predicted: “In the near future we shall establish the responsibility of presidents. . . . We shall invest the president with the right of declaring a state of war.” A president, of course, is far easier to control than an entire legislature. The U.S. Constitution had decreed that declaration of war was the responsibility of Congress. How, then, to steal this authority away? In 1944 the CFR prepared a memorandum for the State Department which stated: “A further possible difficulty was cited, namely, that arising from the Constitutional provision that only Congress may declare war. This argument was countered with the contention that a treaty would override this barrier, let alone the fact that our participation in such a police action as might be recommended by the international security organization [UN] need not necessarily be construed as war.”
When the Senate ratified the UN Charter, it effectively relinquished its authority to declare war – an authority that has not been invoked since. President Truman sent troops to Korea without so much as consulting Congress. At his press conference of July 29, 1950, Truman explained: “We are not at war; this is a police action.” The United States suffered over 100,000 casualties in Korea – but not to worry, this wasn’t war, just “police action,” surely a testimony to the power of Orwellian semantics.
Congress did not protest Truman’s action very vigorously because the Illuminati were playing a clever trump card. The strongest opponents of the UN in Congress were also staunch anti-communists. They had vigorously condemned the Truman State Department for allowing (in fact, pushing) China’s fall to Communism. In the case of Korea, Truman now appeared to be atoning for that deed by sending American troops to halt communist aggression. Congressional conservatives faced a catch-22. If they tried to assert their Congressional prerogatives, Korea might be lost to Kim Il-sung’s rapidly advancing communist troops in the meantime.
But we can have no illusions. The backstage Illuminists controlling the American government had no intention of “fighting communism.” General Douglas MacArthur, commander of the UN forces, learned this the hard way. MacArthur not only succeeded in repelling the North Korean invasion, but – following his soldier’s instincts – he pursued victory, and liberated North Korea from communism nearly all the way to the Yalu River, which marks the border of China. At this point, Red China poured its troops into the conflict. MacArthur ordered the Yalu’s bridges bombed to keep the Chinese out, but within hours his order was countermanded by the Secretary of Defense, General George Marshall.
Marshall was the CFR’s military shill, a Judas in 5-star shoulder boards. He had betrayed the men of Pearl Harbor by withholding his foreknowledge of the 1941 attack; from 1945 to 1949 he had, as “special envoy” to China and then Secretary of State, helped condemn millions of Chinese to death through his manipulations on behalf of the Communists. Now as Secretary of Defense, he once again served as the Communists’ confederate by chaining GIs with the new concept of “limited war.” Victory had become an anachronism, replaced by “containment,” the idea originated in the famous “Mr. X” article in Foreign Affairs. Senator Joe McCarthy saw right through Marshall, condemning him in his 1951 book America’s Retreat from Victory: The Story of George Catlett Marshall. Predictably, McCarthy wound up dead and “disgraced,” while Marshall was awarded the 1953 Nobel Peace Prize.
General MacArthur said of Marshall’s order to leave the Yalu bridges alone – which cost thousands of GIs their lives – “I realized for the first time that I had actually been denied the use of my full military power to safeguard the lives of my soldiers and the safety of my army. To me, it clearly foreshadowed a future tragic situation in Korea, and left me with a sense of inexpressible shock.” MacArthur was soon dismissed from command in Korea. Like Patton, he was expendable once he had served his purposes.
We should not underestimate the importance of Harry Truman’s 1950 statement: “I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa. As a corollary of this action I am calling upon the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland. The Seventh Fleet will see that this is done.”
The joker in this deck was the “corollary.” Chiang Kai-shek and his nationalist army on Formosa (Taiwan) had been threatening to invade the mainland, in an effort to retake it from the communists, whose control there was still tenuous. By removing this threat, Truman freed up Chinese communist troops for their attack across the Yalu. In effect, Truman had the Seventh Fleet protect the communists’ flank while they killed American soldiers. (None of this would surprise any student of the subsequent Vietnam War’s realpolitik, in which Washington’s “rules of engagement” turned what could have been a 6-month victory into a 14-year defeat with 58,000 GIs dead.)
General Lin Piao, commander of Chinese forces in Korea, later stated: “I never would have made the attack and risked my men and my military reputation if I had not been assured that Washington would restrain General MacArthur from taking adequate retaliatory measures against my lines of supply and communication.”
Perhaps the greatest irony of all: the Soviet Union could have prevented the UN action in Korea simply by exercising its veto power as a member of the Security Council. After all, Kim Il-sung was their puppet. However, on the day of the Korea vote, the Soviet delegation was absent. They were in the middle of a walkout they had staged over the failure of the UN to seat Red China. UN Secretary General Trygve Lie expressly invited Jacob Malik, Soviet Ambassador to the UN, to attend the Korea vote, but he declined. Establishment historians refer to this as a “Soviet blunder.” But politicians rarely blunder. If Malik (died 1980) had really goofed, Stalin would have had him nailed to a board.
The Korean War was not about victory on either side. It was about validating the UN as “peacekeeper.” Including civilian casualties, some three million people died on this altar to world government. When the war ended in 1953, Korea’s North-South borders were restored to approximately where they had been at the outset: the 38th parallel. General Mark Clark commented: “In carrying out the instructions of my government, I gained the unenviable distinction of being the first United States Army commander in history to sign an armistice without victory.”