It’s an amazingly powerful weapon that only the US government can wield—kicking anyone it doesn’t like out of the world’s US-dollar-based financial system.
It’s a weapon foreign banks fear. A sound institution can be rendered insolvent at the flip of a switch that the US government controls. It would be akin to an economic kiss of death. When applied to entire countries—such as the case with Iran—it’s like a nuclear attack on the country’s financial system.
That is because, thanks to the petrodollar regime, the US dollar is still the world’s reserve currency, and that indirectly gives the US a chokehold on international trade.
For example, if a company in Italy wants to buy products made in India, the Indian seller probably will want to be paid in US dollars. So the company in Italy first needs to purchase those dollars on the foreign exchange market. But it can’t do so without involving a bank that is permitted to operate in the US. And no such bank will cooperate if it finds that the Italian company is on any of Washington’s bad-boy lists.
The US dollar may be just a facilitator for an international transaction unrelated to any product or service tied to the US, but it’s a facilitator most buyers and sellers in world markets want to use. Thus Uncle Sam’s ability to say “no dollars for you” gives it tremendous leverage to pressure other countries.
The BRICS countries have been trying to move toward a more multipolar international financial system, but it’s an arduous process. Any weakening of the US government’s ability to use the dollar as a stick to compel compliance is likely years away.
When the time comes, no country will care about losing access to the US financial system any more than it would worry today about being shut out of the peso-based Mexican financial system. But for a while yet, losing Uncle Sam’s blessing still can be an economic kiss of death, as the recent experience of Banca Privada d’Andorra shows.
Andorra, a Peculiar Country Without a Central Bank
The Principality of Andorra is a tiny jurisdiction sandwiched between Spain and France in the eastern Pyrenees mountains. It hasn’t joined the EU and thus is not burdened by every edict passed down in Brussels. However, as a matter of practice, the euro is in general use. Interestingly, the country does not have a central bank.
Andorra is a renowned offshore banking jurisdiction. Banking is the country’s second-biggest source of income, after tourism. Its five banks had made names for themselves by being particularly well capitalized, welcoming to nonresidents (even Americans), and willing to work with offshore companies and international trusts.
One Andorran bank that had been recommended prominently by others (but not by International Man) is Banca Privada d’Andorra (BPA).
Recently BPA received the financial kiss of death from FinCEN, the US Treasury Department’s financial crimes bureau. FinCEN accused BPA of laundering money for individuals in Russia, China, and Venezuela—interestingly, all geopolitical rivals of the US.
Never mind that unlike murder, robbery and rape, money laundering is a victimless, make-believe crime invented by US politicians.
But let’s set that argument aside and assume that money laundering is indeed a real crime. While FinCEN seems to enjoy pointing the money-laundering finger here and there, it never mentions that New York and London are among of the busiest money laundering centers in the world, which underscores the political, not criminal, nature of their accusations.
And that’s all it takes, a mere accusation from FinCEN to shatter the reputation of a foreign bank and the confidence of its depositors.
The foreign bank has little recourse. There is no adjudication to determine whether the accusation has any merit nor is there any opportunity for the bank to make a defense to stop the damage to its reputation.
And not even the most solvent foreign banks—such as BPA—are immune.
Shortly after FinCEN made its accusation public, BPA’s global correspondent accounts—which allow it to conduct international transactions—were closed. No other bank wants to risk Washington’s ire by doing business with a blacklisted institution. BPA was effectively banned from the international financial system.
This predictably led to an evaporation of confidence by BPA’s depositors. To prevent a run on the bank, the Andorran government took BPA under its administration and imposed a €2,500 per week withdrawal limit on depositors.
However, it’s not just BPA that is feeling the results of Washington’s displeasure. FinCEN’s accusation against BPA is sending a shockwave that is shaking Andorra to its core.
The ordeal has led S&P to downgrade Andorra’s credit rating, noting that “The risk profile of Andorra’s financial sector, which is large relative to the size of the domestic economy, has increased beyond our expectations.”
For comparison, BPA’s assets amount to €3 billion, and the Andorran government’s annual budget is only €400 million. There is no way the government could bail out BPA even if it wanted to.
The last time there was a banking crisis in a European country with an oversized financial sector, many depositors were blindsided with a bail-in and lost most, or in some cases, all of their money over €100,000.
While the damage to BPA’s customers appears to be contained for the moment, it remains to be seen whether Andorra turns into the next Cyprus.
BPA is hardly the only example of a US government attack on a foreign bank. In a similar fashion in 2013, the US effectively shut down Bank Wegelin, Switzerland’s oldest bank, which, like BPA, operated without branches in the US.
To appreciate the brazen overreach that has become routine for FinCEN, it helps to examine matters from an alternative perspective.
Imagine that China was the world’s dominant financial power instead of the US and it had the power to enforce its will and trample over the sovereignty of other countries. Imagine bureaucrats in Beijing having the power to effectively shut down any bank in the world. Imagine those same bureaucrats accusing BNY Mellon (Bank of New York is the oldest bank in the US) of breaking some Chinese financial law and cutting it off from the international financial system, causing a crisis of confidence and effectively shuttering it.
In a world of fiat currencies and fractional reserve banking, that is a power—a financial weapon—that the steward of the international financial system wields.
Currently, that steward is the US. It remains to be seen whether or not the BRICS will learn to be just as overbearing once their parallel international financial system is up and running.
In any case, the new system will give the world an alternative, and that will be a good thing.
But regardless of what the international financial system is going to look like, you should take action now to protect yourself from getting caught in the crossfire when financial weapons are going off.
One way to make sure your savings don’t go poof the next time some bureaucrat at FinCEN decides a bank did something that they didn’t like is to offshore your money into safe jurisdictions. And we’ve put together an in-depth video presentation to help you do just that. It’s called, “Internationalizing Your Assets.”
Our all-star panel of experts, with Doug Casey and Peter Schiff, provide low-cost options for international diversification that anyone can implement – including how to safely set up foreign storage for your gold and silver bullion and how to move your savings abroad without triggering invasive reporting requirements. This is a must watch video for any investor and it’s completely free.
This article may be re-posted in full with attribution.
05 09 15 PRESIDENTIAL QUESTIONS PART 1 and 2
By Dr. Edwin Vieira, Jr., Ph.D., J.D.
May 9, 2015
Not long ago, a friend of mine asked me to draft a few pertinent, if not provocative, questions to be posed to all of the candidates who run for the Presidency in the 2016 elections. After what should be the initial question posed to every aspirant to “the Office of President”—namely, “Are you actually ‘eligible to th[at] Office’ by virtue of being ‘a natural born Citizen’ under Article II, Section 1, Clause 4 of the Constitution?”—the following queries came to my mind:
- Are there any principles of government in George Washington’s Farewell Addresswhich you, as President, would not attempt to put into practice? If so, what are they; and why and how would you deviate from them?
- This country’s monetary and banking systems have slipped into a state of chronic crisis, which threatens to devolve into a nationwide financial collapse. As President, how would you utilize the authority granted to you under Title 12, United States Code, Section 95(a), to deal with this situation?
- As President, how would you support those States that adopted an alternative currency pursuant to the authority the Constitution reserves to them in Article I, Section 10, Clause 1?
- As President, under Article II, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution you would be the “Commander in Chief * * * of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States”. Today, no State fields a constitutional Militia. Would you therefore demand revitalization of the Militia in the several States as soon as possible—and how would you go about it?
- Many Americans fear that, in a severe national crisis, such as a collapse of the monetary and banking systems, “martial law” will be imposed. As President, under what circumstances would you support the use of “martial law”, and on what constitutional basis?
- The Supreme Court takes the position that a decision which it renders on an issue of constitutional law is itself “the supreme law of the land”, which can be reversed only by a subsequent decision of the Court or an amendment of the Constitution. As President, would you accede to this theory of “judicial supremacy”? If not, why and how would you oppose it?
- Many Americans believe that the current resident of the White House, Barack Obama, has never been eligible for “the Office of President” because he is not a “natural born Citizen”, and that the facts concerning his ineligibility have been systematically ignored, covered up, and even falsified by rogue public officials at every level of the federal system. As President, would you immediately open an investigation into this question so as to settle the matter once and for all? If not, why not?
- Many Americans believe that the official inquiries into the 9/11 event, especially with respect to the destruction of World Trade Center Building 7, are seriously deficient. As President, would you immediately open an investigation into this question, inviting full and fair participation by all interested parties, with timely and complete disclosure of all relevant information held by every governmental department, bureau, and other agency, so as to settle the matter once and for all? If not, why not?
I must concede that these are questions which the candidates put forward by the “two” major political parties will never be asked by any political journalist from the big “mainstream” print and electronic media. Not, however, because these questions are unimportant, or because they have no specific answers. Quite the contrary. To demonstrate that these are not merely theoretical and quixotic inquiries, for purposes of illustration I shall expand on the practical significance of the second question: “This country’s monetary and banking systems have slipped into a state of chronic crisis, which threatens to eventuate in a nationwide financial collapse. As President, how would you utilize the authority granted to you under Title 12, United States Code, Section 95(a), to deal with this situation?” In doing so, I shall also touch on the fourth question: “As President, under Article II, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution you would be the “Commander in Chief * * * of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States”. Today, no State fields a constitutional Militia. Would you therefore demand revitalization of the Militia in the several States as soon as possible—and how would you go about it?”
Now, how should a patriotic President, intent upon restoring an economically sound, honest, and especially constitutional monetary system in this country as quickly and effectively as possible, answer these questions? The proper response is quite straightforward. Section 95(a) mandates that,
[i]n order to provide for the safer and more effective operation of the National Banking System and the Federal Reserve System, to preserve for the people the full benefits of the currency provided for by the Congress through the National Banking System and the Federal Reserve System, and to relieve interstate commerce of the burdens and obstructions resulting from the receipt on an unsound or unsafe basis of deposits subject to withdrawal by check, during such emergency period as the President of the United States by proclamation may prescribe, no member bank of the Federal Reserve System shall transact any banking business except to such extent and subject to such regulations, limitations and restrictions as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury, with the approval of the President. Any individual, partnership, corporation, or association, or any director, officer or employee thereof, violating any of the provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or, if a natural person, may, in addition to such fine, be imprisoned for a term not exceeding ten years. Each day that any such violation continues shall be deemed a separate offense.
Importantly, this statute imposes no constraints whatsoever on the “regulations, limitations and restrictions” which the Secretary of the Treasury may “prescribe * * * with the approval of the President”. (I do not intend here to enter into an investigation as to whether this provision is constitutional or not, in whole or in part. Suffice it to say that it is at least as constitutional as any part of the Federal Reserve Act, and certainly sufficiently constitutional to be used to correct the worst deficiencies in that Act “during [the present] emergency period”. After all, at this perilous stage in the tortuous course of human events, monetary reformers must act in reliance upon the old adage that “it takes a crooked stick to beat a mad dog”. And what sort of stick would be more suitable in this situation than one which Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal has provided?)
So, in general, to master the present monetary and banking crisis a patriotic President could and should “by proclamation” “prescribe” a suitable “emergency period” during which 12 U.S.C. § 95(a) were to take effect (presumably, until the crisis had abated)—simultaneously (or, preferably, well beforehand) he should draft the necessary “regulations, limitations and restrictions”—then he should order that those “regulations, limitations and restrictions” be “prescribed by [his hand-picked] Secretary of the Treasury”, precisely as written so as to obtain the President’s “approval”—and finally he should enforce those “regulations, limitations and restrictions” swiftly, surely, and severely, pursuant to his duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” under Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution.
In particular, the President should so draft and his Secretary of the Treasury should so “prescribe[ ]” the “regulations, limitations and restrictions” as to achieve the statute’s two purposes: namely, (a) “to preserve for the people the full benefits of the currency provided for by the Congress through the national banking system and the Federal reserve system”; and (b) “to relieve interstate commerce of the burdens and obstructions resulting from the receipt on an unsound or unsafe basis of deposits subject to withdrawal by check”. Consider each of these in turn—
(a) Originally, “the full benefits of the currency provided for by the Congress through the national banking system and the Federal reserve system” were bipartite.
(i) On the one hand, those “benefits” included the statutory right of all Americans to require that Federal Reserve Notes “shall be redeemed in gold on demand at the Treasury of the United States, in the city of Washington, District of Columbia, or in gold or lawful money at any Federal reserve bank”. An Act To provide for the establishment of Federal reserve banks, to furnish an elastic currency, to afford means of rediscounting commercial paper, to establish a more effective supervision of banking in the United States, and for other purposes, Act of 23 December 1913, CHAP. 6, § 16, , 38 Stat. 251, 265. As this statute made clear, the banks themselves were not required as a matter of law in the first instance to redeem Federal Reserve Notes solely in gold (although as a matter of fact they generally did so prior to 1933 domestically and prior to 1971 internationally); but they were required to maintain a large reserve of gold in order to ensure that, at some point, they could be held fully liable for such redemption:
Every Federal reserve bank shall maintain * * * reserves in gold of not less than forty per centum against its Federal reserve notes in actual circulation, and not offset by gold or lawful money deposited with the Federal reserve agent. * * * Notes presented for redemption at the Treasury of the United States shall be paid out of the redemption fund and returned to the Federal reserve banks through which they were originally issued, and thereupon such Federal reserve bank shall, upon demand of the Secretary of the Treasury, reimburse such redemption fund in lawful money or, if such Federal reserve notes have been redeemed by the Treasurer in gold or gold certificates, then such funds shall be reimbursed to the extent deemed necessary by the Secretary of the Treasury in gold or gold certificates, and such Federal reserve bank shall, so long as any of its Federal reserve notes remain outstanding, maintain with the Treasurer in gold an amount sufficient in the judgment of the Secretary to provide for all redemptions to be made by the Treasurer.
The Federal Reserve Board shall require each Federal reserve bank to maintain on deposit in the Treasury of the United States a sum in gold sufficient in the judgment of the Secretary of the Treasury for the redemption of the Federal reserve notes issued to such bank, but in no event less than five per centum; but such deposit of gold shall be counted and included as part of the forty per centum reserve hereinbefore required.
Act of 23 December 1913, § 16,  and , 38 Stat. at 266. At that time, the statutorily fixed rate of exchange was 20.67 “dollars” per ounce of gold, or 23.22 grains of gold per “dollar”. An Act To define and fix the standard of value, to maintain the parity of all forms of money issued or coined by the United States, to refund the public debt, and for other purposes, Act of 14 March 1900, CHAP. 41, § 1, 31 Stat. 45, 45.
Even with these apparent safeguards in place, however, Congress carefully provided in the Federal Reserve Act that “[t]he right to amend, alter, or repeal this Act is hereby expressly reserved”, so that the lessons later experience taught could easily be applied. Act of 23 December 1914, § 30, 38 Stat. at 275. Unfortunately, in a misguided response to the banking crisis of the early 1930s, Congress relied on this reserved right to remove the requirement for redemption of Federal Reserve Notes in gold. AN ACT To protect the currency system of the United States, to provide for the better use of the monetary gold stock of the United States, and for other purposes, Act of 30 January 1934, CHAPTER 6, § 2(b)(1), 48 Stat. 337, 337, now codified at 12 U.S.C. § 411. Yet, during the same crisis, Congress, in what ultimately became 12 U.S.C. § 95(a), authorized the President and the Secretary of the Treasury to prescribe by regulations whatever changes in the Federal Reserve Act the future might prove to be necessary in order to deal with such matters. See AN ACT To provide relief in the existing national emergency in banking, and for other purposes, Act of 9 March 1933, CHAPTER 1, § 4, 48 Stat. 1, 2.
Subsequent experience has now taught this country that the only way to obtain “the full benefits of the currency provided for by the Congress through the national banking system and the Federal reserve system” with respect to the original statutory goal of maintaining a permanent relationship between that “currency” and gold is to impose directly upon the banks themselves, both in the first place and in the final analysis, a requirement that they make Federal Reserve Notes freely exchangeable for gold at all times.
(ii) On the other hand, when the Federal Reserve Act was passed, Americans were already legally entitled to exchange gold coin of the United States for silver coin of the United States at a statutorily fixed ratio (supposedly the exchange-rate between the two metals set in the free market). So, in practice, “the full benefits of the currency provided for by the Congress through the national banking system and the Federal reserve system” originally included a paper currency which, in one way or another, could be exchanged for silver, as well as gold, coin of the United States. Americans’ ability to require the Treasury to exchange any forms of United States paper currency for silver ended, however, in 1968. AN ACT To authorize adjustments in the amount of outstanding silver certificates, and for other purposes, Act of 24 June 1967, Public Law 90-29, § 2, 81 Stat. 77, 77. Subsequent experience has taught this country the serious error of that policy. Therefore, in order to bring America’s monetary system as quickly as possible into complete compliance with constitutional principles, as well as sound economics, a requirement for exchangeability of Federal Reserve Notes for silver should be included in whatever regulations were to be issued under the auspices of 12 U.S.C. § 95(a).
© 2015 Edwin Vieira, Jr. – All Rights Reserved
(iii) In sum, a patriotic President (and Secretary of the Treasury) could require both the Federal Reserve regional banks and the member banks of the Federal Reserve System to exchange Federal Reserve Notes for gold and silver coin of the United States. As noted above, the Federal Reserve regional banks—of which the member banks of the System are stockholders—were originally required to redeem their notes in gold. In addition, from the beginning they were granted, and still enjoy, the power “[t]o deal in gold coin and bullion at home and abroad, to make loans thereon, exchange Federal reserve notes for gold, gold coin, or gold certificates, and to contract for loans of gold coin or bullion”. Act of 23 December 1913, § 14(a), 38 Stat. at 264, now codified at 12 U.S.C. § 354. Therefore, under Section 30 of the Federal Reserve Act implemented through and otherwise coupled with 12 U.S.C. § 95(a), a patriotic President could require the Federal Reserve regional banks which the member banks control, as well as the member banks themselves, to exchange Federal Reserve Notes for gold for the benefit of “the people” of this country. Inasmuch as neither Section 30 of the Federal Reserve Act nor 12 U.S.C. § 95(a) precludes adding silver to this requirement, the banks can be assigned the further power to deal in silver to the same extent as they may deal in gold, and the further duty to exchange Federal Reserve Notes for silver to the same extent that they exchange those Notes for gold. It is, of course, true that a statute declares that “[t]he United States may not pay out any gold coin”. 31 U.S.C. § 5118(b). Whether this statute is constitutional or not is a moot point, however; for neither the Federal Reserve regional banks nor the member banks of the Federal Reserve System qualify as “the United States”.
As a practical matter, whatever regulations the President finally approved under 12 U.S.C. § 95(a) would have to establish definite units of gold and silver which the banks were to employ with respect to exchanges of those metals for Federal Reserve Notes. The original Federal Reserve Act did not explicitly set a rate of exchange between Federal Reserve Notes and gold, because that rate was implicitly determined in the statutory definition of a “gold dollar” at 23.22 grains (0.0484 ounces) of gold per “dollar”. Thus, at that time a Federal Reserve Note promising to pay (say) “20 dollars” had to be exchanged for (redeemed with) “20 dollars” worth of gold, which amounted to 0.9675 ounces of that metal. Today, in order to take advantage of the latest technology in the area of so-called “electronic gold” and “electronic silver”, the units of weight subject to exchange for Notes should be the grain of gold and the grain of silver—and all possible multiples thereof, including decimal fractions (0.1, 0.01, 0.001, and so on). To conform to constitutional and statutory requirements, however, these weights should still be valued in “dollars”, with one “dollar” in silver containing 480 grains of that metal, and one “dollar” in gold containing 480 grains of that metal multiplied by the exchange-ratio between gold and silver then-existing in the free market.
Although (as noted above) the original Federal Reserve Act provided implicitly for a rate of exchange between Federal Reserve Notes and gold, it did not fix that rate unalterably, but in its Section 30 left entirely to Congress the right, power, and privilege to re-determine the rate howsoever future circumstances might warrant. And, indeed, in the early 1930s Congress removed the requirement for redemption of those Notes in gold altogether, so that the rate of exchange thereafter became, and still remains, zero. AN ACT To protect the currency system of the United States, to provide for the better use of the monetary gold stock of the United States, and for other purposes, Act of 30 January 1934, CHAPTER 6, § 2(b)(1), 48 Stat. 337, 337, now codified at 12 U.S.C. § 411. Revealingly, no one ever challenged the elimination of redemption of Federal Reserve Notes in gold as unconstitutional—for the self-evidently sound reason that Congress had explicitly reserved the plenary right to do so when redemption was originally included in the Federal Reserve Act. So today, under Section 30 of the Federal Reserve Act implemented through and coupled with 12 U.S.C. § 95(a), a patriotic President and Secretary of the Treasury could require the banks to adopt whatever rates of exchange between Federal Reserve Notes and gold, and between those Notes and silver, the President and the Secretary believed would “preserve for the people the full benefits of the currency system provided for by the Congress”. And that requirement embodied in a regulation today would be just as constitutional as was either the initial requirement of redemption of Federal Reserve Notes in gold in the statute of 1913, or the removal of that requirement in the statute of 1934.
Nonetheless, today everyone with any financial insight at all realizes that it would be economically impossible for the banks to redeem Federal Reserve Notes in gold at the fixed rate of exchange employed in 1913 and 1934; and no less impossible for them to redeem those Notes in an equivalent fixed amount of silver. Therefore, to ease their transition from a system of effectively fiat paper currency to one of economically sound and constitutional money, the banks should be allowed to exchange Federal Reserve Notes for the ever-varying amounts of gold and silver for which those Notes exchange in the free market from day to day. The success of such a transition, of course, would depend upon a properly functioning free market—for the preservation of which the President and the Secretary of the Treasury would need to promulgate specific regulations to dissuade and prevent bankers and their cronies in the underworld of high finance from attempting, directly or indirectly, to manipulate the gold and silver markets, and to punish them in truly exemplary fashion should deterrence fail. Overall, the banks should not be heard to complain, because this arrangement would be far less onerous as to them than were the traditional requirements that bank notes be redeemed with precious metals at statutorily fixed rates of exchange.
To put the new system of exchange into practice, the regulations under 12 U.S.C. § 95(a) should require all of the member banks of the Federal Reserve System which conduct operations in each State, together with the particular Federal Reserve regional bank the statutorily assigned district of which includes that State, to establish and thereafter administer a common gold and silver depository in that State (the ultimate goal being fifty such depositories). The banks would offer all of their customers accounts through which the latter could: (i) exchange Federal Reserve Notes for gold and silver, and gold and silver for Federal Reserve Notes—so that a completely free market for such transactions could function throughout the United States; and (ii) accept deposits of gold and silver from their customers, and make payments in gold and silver to other customers with similar accounts—so that gold and silver could be efficiently employed as actual media of exchange in Americans’ common day-to-day commercial transactions. The costs of maintaining this system would be deemed to be among “the necessary expenses of a Federal reserve bank”, after the payment of which “the stockholders [of such bank, being primarily the member banks in that region] shall be entitled to receive an annual dividend of 6 per centum on the paid-in capital stock”. See Act of 23 December 1913, § 7, , 38 Stat. at 258, now codified at 12 U.S.C. § 289. It would be eminently just to impose on the banks the costs for repairing the nation’s banking system along these lines, because the imprudence and even profligacy of the Federal Reserve’s managers (from both the regional banks and the member banks) caused the banking cartel to “go off the gold standard” in the first place.
(b) In order to achieve the second goal of 12 U.S.C. § 95(a)—that is, “to relieve interstate commerce of the burdens and obstructions resulting from the receipt on an unsound or unsafe basis of deposits subject to withdrawal by check”—the new system for exchanging Federal Reserve Notes for gold and silver and for employing gold and silver as common media of exchange through the Federal Reserve regional banks and the member banks of the Federal Reserve System must be secured from the problems associated with “fractional reserves”. To accomplish this, the new regulations must stipulate that: (i) the customers’ deposits of gold and silver are the property of the customers alone, not of the banks to any degree; (ii) the banks may not deal in their depositors’ gold or silver except to transfer ownership from one account to another upon and in strict accordance with their depositors’ orders; (iii) the depositors enjoy first liens on the assets of the banks for the values of their deposits, so that their claims against the banks come before the claims of all other private creditors; and (iv) the depositors’ claims against the banks must be settled in gold and silver only (that is, by specific performance, rather than with “monetary damages” paid in some other currency).
(c) That 12 U.S.C. § 95(a) posits the existence of “burdens and obstructions [on interstate commerce] resulting from the receipt on an unsound or unsafe basis for deposits subject to withdrawal by check”; that it allows for an “emergency period” which “the President of the United States by proclamation may prescribe”; and that it imposes truly draconian penalties upon entities and individuals which and who even for a single day violate the “regulations, limitations and restrictions” to be “prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury, with the approval of the President”—all plainly indicate Congress’s understanding that America’s national security would be imperiled by a collapse of or other crisis which destabilized the Federal Reserve System. Moreover, inasmuch as the Second Amendment recognizes that “[a] well regulated Militia” is “necessary to the security of a free State” in every State throughout this country, and with respect to every possible type of “security” relevant to freedom; inasmuch as Article I, Section 8, Clause 15 of the Constitution empowers Congress “[t]o provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union”; inasmuch as Article II, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution invests the President with the status of “Commander in Chief * * * of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States”; and inasmuch as 10 U.S.C. § 332 provides that, “whenever the President considers that unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages * * * make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in any State by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, he may call into Federal service such of the militia of any State * * * as he considers necessary to enforce those laws”—for all of these reasons taken together, the Militia and only the Militia should be assigned the authority and responsibility to supervise enforcement of the new regulations by which Section 30 of the Federal Reserve Act would be implemented through and otherwise coupled with 12 U.S.C. § 95(a).
After all, dolorous experience in this country for the last hundred years—and especially during the last decade—amply supports the conclusions that:
(i) Particularly with respect to their long-standing opposition to the constitutional monetary system of silver and gold, the banks in the Federal Reserve System, along with their allies in the underworld of high finance, have proven themselves again and again to be “unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages” against the public interest.
(ii) The failure of every attempt to date to bring the banks and their financial partisans to heel demonstrates the impracticality of enforcing the laws of the United States against those parties “in any State by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings”.
(iii) That Congress has exposed the banks to the severe strictures of 12 U.S.C. § 95(a) demonstrates its recognition that, under certain circumstances (which plainly obtain today), the banks may collectively constitute combinations too powerful to be suppressed or otherwise disciplined by any other, less-rigorous means. But,
(iv) Precisely because of their severity and potential efficacy, those strictures will be enforceable to the necessary degree only through deployment of the Militia—which, being composed of the American people themselves, alone can supply sufficient personnel who cannot be co-opted or compromised by the banks.
For the purpose of enforcing Section 30 of the Federal Reserve Act as implemented through and coupled with 12 U.S.C. § 95(a), the President could with confidence as well as propriety call upon members of the so-called “unorganized militia”. See 10 U.S.C. § 311(b)(2). See, e.g., Code of Virginia §§ 44-1 and 44-4. I use Virginia as an example only because I happen to live in the Commonwealth. A quick search of other States’ codes can discover equivalent provisions. (Again, I do not intend to inquire here as to the constitutionality vel non of an “unorganized militia”. Having written extensively on the subject in such books as The Sword and Sovereignty, I leave it to readers of this commentary to recall that printing , both with ink and electrons, has been invented, and that it would behoove them to take advantage of that fact. But once more I must remind my readers that, at the present perilous time, “it takes a crooked stick to beat a mad dog”.)
Because the “unorganized militia” consists of the great bulk of this country’s adult population, it would be no difficult task to find within “such of the militia of any State * * * as [t]he [President] considers necessary to enforce those laws” a superfluity of individuals who had appropriate education, skills, and experience with regard to the information technology, to the supervision of banks and other financial institutions, to accounting, and to the allied disciplines required for the operations of gold and silver depositories as well as the general surveillance and control of the banks in relation to such operations. The Militia could easily supply all of the personnel necessary and sufficient to provide actual day-to-day physical security for and to administer the depositories, as well as to monitor all of the other activities of the banks that were subject to the regulations promulgated under 12 U.S.C. § 95(a). The Militia, more than any other group within society, would have a keen economic interest in seeing to it that the regulations were enforced to the letter.
And because the “unorganized militia” would supply such a huge pool from which the President could draw the necessary personnel, the bankers and their clients in the underworld of high finance would find it utterly impossible to coöpt, corrupt, or coerce enough Militiamen to subvert the Militia’s supervision of the banks anywhere throughout this country. (Observe, too, that, contrary to the criticism labeled against those who advocate revitalization of the Militia, this proposal does not involve, or even suggest, the use of “violence” by the Militia in the performance of their duties.)
Thus, the foregoing provides an answer to one question which should be posed to every candidate for the Presidency in 2016 (assuming that the monetary and banking systems have not already collapsed before then). If a candidate cannot supply this answer or something closely akin to it, he (or she) is plainly unqualified for “the Office of President” even if “eligible to th[at] Office” on the basis of citizenship. The point of this exercise, though, is to be found not in the expectation that any of the candidates the “two” political parties will foist on America will be asked this question (or, if they were, could intelligibly answer it), but in the demonstration that problems such as the question addresses do have solutions ready to hand, if a little thought is applied to the matter.
Perhaps if patriots were to press throughout the alternative media for questions of this kind to be asked and answered, the Presidential election would take on some substance.
Edwin Vieira, Jr., holds four degrees from Harvard: A.B. (Harvard College), A.M. and Ph.D. (Harvard Graduate School of Arts and Sciences), and J.D. (Harvard Law School).
For more than thirty years he has practiced law, with emphasis on constitutional issues. In the Supreme Court of the United States he successfully argued or briefed the cases leading to the landmark decisions Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, and Communications Workers of America v. Beck, which established constitutional and statutory limitations on the uses to which labor unions, in both the private and the public sectors, may apply fees extracted from nonunion workers as a condition of their employment.
He has written numerous monographs and articles in scholarly journals, and lectured throughout the county. His most recent work on money and banking is the two-volume Pieces of Eight: The Monetary Powers and Disabilities of the United States Constitution (2002), the most comprehensive study in existence of American monetary law and history viewed from a constitutional perspective. www.piecesofeight.us
He is also the co-author (under a nom de plume) of the political novel CRA$HMAKER: A Federal Affaire (2000), a not-so-fictional story of an engineered crash of the Federal Reserve System, and the political upheaval it causes.www.crashmaker.com
He can be reached at his new address:
52 Stonegate Court
Front Royal, VA 22630.
E-Mail: Not available